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Abstract. The beauty of Anselm’s ontological argument is, I  believe, that no 
matter how one approaches it, one cannot refute it without making a significant 
metaphysical assumption, one that is likely to be contentious in its own right. 
Peter millican (2004, 2007) disagrees. He introduces an  objection according 
to which one can refute the argument merely by analysing its shallow logical 
details, without making any significant metaphysical assumption. He maintains, 
moreover, that his objection does not depend on a  specific reading of the 
relevant Anselmian text; in fact, millican claims that his objection is applicable 
to every version of the ontological argument. In this paper, I argue that millican’s 
objection does not succeed, because, contrary to what he says, in order to justify 
his objection he does have to make a deep metaphysical assumption and rely on 
a specific reading of Anselm’s text.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
In his 2004 paper, Peter millican formulates the ontological argument 
found in Anselm’s Proslogion and develops a radically new objection to it. 
In my 2007 paper I argue for the following three claims: (i) it is not obvious 
that Anselm’s text supports millican’s formulation of the ontological 
argument, (ii) there is an alternative formulation of the argument that 
is consistent with the text, and (iii) the alternative formulation is not 
vulnerable to millican’s objection. In his 2007 paper millican argues that 
the alternative formulation fails, for more or less the same reason that 
the original formulation fails. The aim of this paper is to raise a difficulty 
1 This paper was read at a meeting of the Joseph butler society at oriel College, oxford. 
I would like to thank members of the society for helpful comments and useful suggestions. 
I would also like to thank Peter millican for our exchange on the ontological argument.
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with millican’s attempt to refute the alternative formulation. Although 
this paper results from my exchange with millican over the last couple 
of years it does not presuppose any familiarity with the earlier papers.
one might claim that it is not very important to examine millican’s 
particular objection to the ontological argument because there is 
a general consensus among philosophers that the argument fails one way 
or the other anyway. I disagree. The beauty of the ontological argument 
is, I believe, that no matter how one approaches it one cannot, if it is 
formulated properly, refute it without making a significant metaphysical 
assumption. such an  assumption seems likely to be contentious 
independently of the debate over the argument itself. In other words, 
there can be no objection to the ontological argument that is obviously 
and uncontroversially successful; this is indeed what the history of the 
debate on the argument seems to have proved for 930-odd years. It is 
important to determine the cogency of millican’s objection precisely 
because he diametrically opposes such a  view. According to millican, 
we can refute the ontological argument with relative ease, merely by 
analysing its shallow logical structure without making any significant 
metaphysical assumption. millican says, moreover, that his objection 
does not depend on a specific reading of the relevant Anselmian text; 
in fact, he claims that his objection is applicable to all versions of the 
ontological argument.
In what follows, I argue that millican’s objection to the ontological 
argument does not succeed because in order to advance his objection 
millican does, ironically, have to make a deep metaphysical assumption 
and rely on a specific reading of Anselm’s text.
II. TWo DIsTINCTIVe FeATures oF mIllICAN’s obJeCTIoN
millican’s objection to the ontological argument has two distinctive 
features. The first is that, unlike other existing objections, his objection is 
meant to undermine the argument without questioning any of Anselm’s 
implicit or explicit metaphysical assumptions. Consider, for example, 
the following two well-known objections that millican contrasts with his 
own objection.
The comparison difficulty: There seems to be something logically odd 
about purporting to compare something that exists only ‘in the mind’ with 
something existing in reality. Therefore Anselm’s premise ... which crucially 
depends on the possibility of doing so, is dubious (millican 2004, p. 443).
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The Kantian dogma (‘existence is not a  predicate’): As Kant famously 
argued (anticipated to a  significant extent by Gassendi and Hume), 
it seems dubious to consider something’s existence as a  property 
that characterizes it, and hence as a  factor that can contribute to the 
assessment of its greatness. rather, its existence seems to be something 
presupposed if it is to have any properties at all (millican 2004, p. 443).
millican thinks that such objections as the comparison difficulty and the 
Kantian dogma are at best ineffective because in order to defend them one 
has to commit oneself to controversial, deep metaphysical assumptions 
such as that the greatness of an existent entity and the greatness of a non-
existent entity are not comparable or that existence is not a  property 
that characterizes its possessor. He maintains that his objection is better 
because it sets aside any metaphysical assumptions and questions only 
shallow logical details of the ontological argument. Thus, as I  explain 
below, he tries to construct an  objection by appealing, on behalf of 
Anselm, to ‘a  radically non-Kantian theory of existence-independent 
“natures” within which [Anselm’s] argument can be framed so as to 
resist the standard objections’ and ‘identify a hitherto unremarked flaw 
in [Anselm’s] reasoning which not only invalidates the argument in its 
original form, but which also, unlike those standard objections, operates 
at a  level which makes it ineradicable by any plausible reformulation’ 
(millican 2004, p. 438). In using the term ‘nature’ millican refers to 
an existence-independent entity and speaks of a nature as ‘instantiated’ 
if such an entity exists in reality.
The second unique feature of millican’s objection is that it purports 
to be neutral with respect to the interpretation of the relevant text, even 
though it might appear otherwise initially. Consider a  key sentence 
in Chapter 2 of Anselm’s Proslogion. m. J. Charlesworth translates the 
sentence as follows:
(Translation 1) [I]f [God] exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought 
to exist in reality also, which is greater. (Anselm 1077-1078, p. 117)
This translation suggests that Anselm compares two beings: God existing 
only in the mind and God existing in the mind as well as in reality. 
millican (2004) claims, however, that this is a  mistranslation. He says 
that it should, rather, be translated as follows:
(Translation 2) [I]f [God] exists solely in the mind, something that is 
greater can be thought to exist in reality also. (millican 2004, p. 439)
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millican says that Translation 2, which can fairly be regarded as a non-
standard interpretation,2 implies that, contrary to what Translation 1 
says, Anselm compares God existing only in the mind and something 
else (i.e., something that isn’t God) existing in the mind as well as in 
reality. However, millican emphasises that he is ‘undogmatic about the 
interpretative issue’ and ‘insist[s on his objection] on a  philosophical 
point’ (millican 2007, p. 1041). In fact he thinks that ‘objections in 
a  similar spirit could be made against all versions of the [o]ntological 
[a]rgument’, not just the specific version that millican formulates on the 
basis of his non-standard reading of Anselm’s text (p. 1043).
III. mIllICAN’s THeorY oF NATure
millican claims that in order to construct a successful objection to the 
ontological argument it is helpful to introduce a  theory that enables 
‘reference to be made to an “entity” (such as God) without presupposing 
either its existence or its non-existence’ (p. 449). millican uses the term 
‘nature’ to denote an existence-independent entity and speaks of a nature 
as ‘instantiated’ if such an entity exists in reality.
According to millican’s theory of natures, the nature of, for example, 
laika, i.e., the russian space dog, can be expressed as follows:
<Laika>: <first dog to be sent into space>
In general, the first set of angle brackets encloses the name of a nature 
and the second set encloses at least one of the most significant properties 
of that nature. Following this format, the natures of lassie, i.e., the 
television dog, and Kings Alfred and Arthur, i.e., british heroes, can be 
expressed as follows:
<Lassie>: <dog, catches villains, rescues victims, star of film and TV>
<Alfred>: <King of england, defeated the Danes, translated boethius>
<Arthur>: <saintly and heroic king, kept a court of knights, sought 
      the Holy Grail>
2 see, for example, Graham oppy (2008, pp. 114-115). oppy surveys five recent 
formulations of the ontological argument provided by millican, Timothy Chambers, 
Jordan Howard sobel, Nicholas everitt, and brian leftow. Among these five interpreters, 
only millican formulates the argument in terms of the comparison of greatness between 
God existing only in the mind and something else existing both in the mind and in 
reality, instead of the comparison of greatness between God existing only in the mind 
and God existing both in the mind and in reality.
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millican maintains that Anselm subscribes implicitly to this theory 
of natures, which enables him to rank them on the basis of their 
greatness. According to millican’s interpretation, Anselm thinks that 
‘among the various criteria for greatness (power, wisdom, goodness, etc.) 
real existence [or instantiation] “trumps” all others, so that any nature 
which has a real archetype, however lowly its characteristic properties 
may be, will on that account alone be greater than any nature, however 
impressively characterized, which does not’ (p. 451). This means that, 
according to millican’s interpretation, Anselm endorses the following 
principle:
The Principle of the superiority of existence (Pse): Any nature that is 
instantiated is greater than any nature that is not instantiated (or any 
nature that is conceived only in the mind).
suppose that lassie is more courageous and smarter than laika. 
According to Pse, however, <lassie> is less great than <laika> because 
it is not, unlike <laika>, instantiated. It is controversial whether or 
not King Arthur really existed; that is, whether or not <Arthur> was 
instantiated. If <Arthur> was instantiated, then it is the greatest among 
the above four natures, for its existence immediately defeats <lassie> 
and its other great-making properties defeat <laika> and <Alfred>. on 
the other hand, if <Arthur> was not instantiated, then it is not as great as 
<Alfred> or even <laika>. It is only greater than <lassie>.
Now the nature of God can be expressed as follows:
<God>: <omniperfect, creator of the universe>
omniperfection includes all divine properties, such as omniscience, 
omnipotence and moral perfection. If <God> is instantiated, then 
it is greater than the above four natures, or indeed any natures at all, 
except <God> itself.3 on the other hand, if <God> is not instantiated, 
then it is not even as great as <laika>; it is only greater than all other 
uninstantiated natures such as <lassie>.
using the concept of natures, millican presents his interpretation of 
the ontological argument as follows (pp. 457-458):
(1) The phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought’ 
is clearly understood by the Fool, and apparently makes sense.
(2) Hence we can take the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-
nature-can-be-thought’ as successfully denoting some specific nature.
3 Here I assume that no other nature is as great as <God>.
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(3) A nature which is instantiated in reality is greater than one which is not.
(4) so if a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought were 
not instantiated in reality, then it would be possible to think of a nature 
that is greater (for example, any nature that is in fact instantiated in reality).
(5) but this would be a contradiction, since it is obviously impossible to 
think of a nature that is greater than a-nature-than-which-no-greater- 
nature-can-be-thought.
(6) Therefore a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought 
must indeed be instantiated in reality.
Notice that premise (3) is equivalent to Pse. on the basis of the above 
interpretation and the theory of natures, millican provides a  unique 
objection to the ontological argument. Whether or not it is legitimate 
to reformulate the ontological argument in terms of natures, as millican 
does, is a matter of further debate. In this paper, however, I assume, in 
favour of millican, that it is legitimate.
IV. mIllICAN’s obJeCTIoN To THe oNToloGICAl ArGumeNT
millican’s objection is concerned with the most crucial phrase in Anselm’s 
ontological argument, namely, ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-
can-be-thought’, which appears in premises (1), (2), (4) and (5). millican 
maintains that there are four possible interpretations of this phrase:
(i) A nature that is so great that no nature is greater
(ii) A nature that can be thought so great that no nature can be 
thought greater
(iii) A nature that is so great that no nature can be thought greater
(iv) A nature that can be thought so great that no nature is greater
Now assume that the following is the greatest instantiated nondivine nature:
<Aurelius>: <absolute emperor of the roman empire, wise, just, 
beneficent>
on this assumption, atheists would think that <Aurelius> is the greatest 
instantiated nature simpliciter, and a fortiori the greatest nature simpliciter. 
millican argues that none of the above four possible interpretations of 
the phrase enables Anselm to convince atheists to hold that <God>, 
rather than <Aurelius>, is the greatest nature.
Consider each of (i) through (iv). Given Pse the following 
observations can be made:
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Phrase (i) denotes an  instantiated nature that is so great that no 
instantiated nature is greater. Atheists would think that, on this 
interpretation, the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-
can-be-thought’ refers to <Aurelius> rather than <God>. Here, the 
ontological argument yields the trivial conclusion that the greatest 
nature is instantiated, i.e., that there exists the greatest existent being.
Phrase (ii) denotes a nature such that if it exists, it is so great that no 
nature can possibly be thought greater. In this case, the phrase refers 
successfully to <God> and the ontological argument runs smoothly 
through premise (4). However, it fails at premise (5), according to 
which it is impossible to think of a nature that is greater than a-nature-
than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought. Given Pse, atheists 
would claim that it is possible to think of a nature that is greater than 
a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought; namely, any 
nature that is instantiated (e.g., <laika>, <Alfred>, <Aurelius>, etc.). 
From the atheistic point of view, they are greater simply because, 
unlike <God>, they are instantiated.
(iii) denotes an instantiated nature that is so great that no nature can 
possibly be thought greater. Atheists would not think of this phrase 
as denoting any nature at all, because there is no such nature unless 
<God> is instantiated. on this interpretation, premise (2), i.e., that we 
can take the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-
thought’ as successfully denoting some specific nature, is unwarranted.
(iv) denotes a nature such that if it is instantiated it is so great that no 
instantiated nature is greater. In this case, the phrase could refer to 
<God>.4 However, the ontological argument fails, again, at premise 
(5) because, given Pse, it is possible for atheists to think of a nature 
that is greater than <God>, namely, instantiated natures, such as 
<laika>, <Alfred> and <Aurelius>.
Therefore, millican concludes that Anselm’s ontological argument 
fails to prove the existence of God.5
4 Here the phrase can refer to the nature of any uninstantiated being that is greater 
than the natures of all instantiated beings. <God> falls into this category but the phrase 
could also refer to other natures that are not as great as <God>. For example, it could 
refer to the nature of a being that is just like Aurelius but slightly more powerful.
5 In addition to this main objection, millican introduces a supplementary objection, 
which appeals to a  Gaunilo-type parody argument (pp. 459-463). According to the 
objection, there must be something wrong with Anselm’s reasoning because we can 
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V. THe AlTerNATIVe FormulATIoN 
oF THe oNToloGICAl ArGumeNT
In my 2007 paper I introduce the following alternative formulation of the 
ontological argument, which is consistent with the relevant Anselmian 
text. more specifically, it is consistent with both Translations 1 and 2 
above (Nagasawa, 2007, pp. 1035-1036):
(1) The phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-
thought’ is clearly understood by the Fool, and apparently makes sense.
(2) Hence we can take the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-
nature-can-be-thought’ as successfully denoting some specific nature.
(3’) A-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought that  is 
instantiated in reality is greater than a-nature-than-which-no-greater- 
nature-can-be-thought that is conceived only in the mind (because 
existence is a great-making property).
(4’) so if a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought 
were not instantiated in reality, then it would be possible to think 
of a nature that is greater; namely, a-nature-than-which-no-greater-
nature-can-be-thought that is instantiated in reality.
(5) but this would be a  contradiction, since it is obviously 
impossible to think of a  nature that is greater than a-nature-than- 
which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought.
(6) Therefore a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought 
must indeed be instantiated in reality.
I  maintain that this formulation of the ontological argument is not 
vulnerable to millican’s objection. Premises (1) and (2) say that, whether 
or not theism is true, the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature- 
can-be-thought’ can be understood by anyone and, hence, the phrase 
denotes a specific nature, irrespective of its existence in reality. In particular, 
given that the phrase is interpreted as a nature that can be thought so 
great that no nature can be thought greater (interpretation (ii) above), it 
successfully denotes <God>. Premise (3’) says that a-nature-than-which-
no-greater-nature-can-be-thought that is instantiated in reality is greater 
than a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought that is 
construct, from the ontological argument, a  parallel argument that yields the absurd 
conclusion that ‘AntiGod’ exists, where AntiGod is a being that is almost identical to 
God, except that, instead of being morally perfect, it is ‘most effectively evil’. The parody 
objection is interesting because, just like millican’s main objection but unlike all other 
objections, it tries to refute the ontological argument without making any metaphysical 
assumptions. see Nagasawa (2010) for a critical assessment of this objection.
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conceived only in the mind. This premise is based on the anti-Kantian 
assumption that existence is a  great-making property. Again, millican 
tries not to dispute any deep metaphysical issues in advancing his 
objection to the ontological argument. specifically, as we saw in section 
2, he does not dispute the anti-Kantian assumption. Hence, in order to 
remain consistent with his own methodology, he cannot reject premise 
(3’). Premises (4’) and (5) say that it would be contradictory if a-nature-
than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought were not instantiated 
in reality because it would then be possible to think of a nature that is 
greater than a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought, 
namely, the same nature that is instantiated in reality. Notice that the 
argument no longer fails at (5) because it abandons Pse by replacing 
(3) with (3’). Given (3’) it is indeed impossible for atheists to think of 
a  nature that is greater than a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-
can-be-thought. The argument concludes that, therefore, a-nature-than-
which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought must be instantiated in reality.
VI. mIllICAN’s resPoNse AND THe AlTerNATIVe FormulATIoN
millican (2007) agrees with me that the above formulation of the 
ontological argument does not fail in the exact same way as the original 
version does. Nevertheless, he maintains that it ‘fails in a closely related 
way’ (millican 2007, p. 1041). He claims, in particular, that it fails not for 
a deep metaphysical reason but, again, for its shallow logical details. In 
what follows, however, I argue that millican’s claim is not cogent because, 
contrary to what he says, in order to apply his objection to the above 
formulation he does have to rely on a deep metaphysical assumption and 
a specific reading of Anselm’s text.
millican accepts (1) and (2). He agrees that if we interpret the 
phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought’ as, as 
I  assume, a  nature that can be thought so great that no nature can be 
thought greater, then the phrase is understood even by atheists and 
successfully denotes <God>. millican argues, however, that I  fail to 
defend the rest of the argument:
but in [defending the rest of the argument] Nagasawa – just like 
Anselm – is blurring the distinction between the level of greatness 
that some nature actually has, and the level of greatness that it can be 
thought to have. Consider, for example, his initial statement of the claim 
that ‘if there were <God> that is instantiated in reality and <God> that 
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is conceived only in the mind, then the former would be greater than 
the latter’. This conditional may sound plausible, but in fact it is deeply 
muddled because its antecedent does not describe any possible situation: 
the nature <God> – which Nagasawa takes to be the referent of Anselm’s 
key phrase – is either instantiated in reality or it is not, and it cannot be 
both. (millican 2007, p. 1051)
This passage seems to miss my point. Again, the nature <God> is defined 
by millican himself as follows:
<God>: <omniperfect, creator of the universe> (millican 2004, p. 453)
my point quoted in the above passage is that the nature described as 
<omniperfect, creator of the universe> would be greater if it were 
instantiated in reality than if it were not. Here existence is treated as 
a property, so there is nothing contradictory in comparing an omniperfect 
creator of the universe with the property of being existent and the same 
being without that property. It is true, as millican says, that the same 
being cannot be both existent and non-existent simultaneously, but that 
is irrelevant to my point.
millican’s response to my argument is more clearly explained in the 
following passage:
Now with this point in mind look at Nagasawa’s step (4’), which says that 
if <God> were not instantiated in reality, then it would be possible to 
think of a nature ‘that is greater’, namely, <God> ‘that is instantiated in 
reality ([millican’s] emphasis). but if <God> is not, in fact, instantiated 
in reality, then it is not possible to think of any nature that in fact achieves 
this higher level of greatness: thinking of <God> as instantiated adds 
nothing to its actual level of greatness. (p. 1052)
This passage suggests that millican’s theory of natures does not 
allow the comparison of greatness between uninstantiated <x> and 
instantiated <x>, even though it might allow the comparison of greatness 
between uninstantiated <x> being thought of not existing in reality and 
uninstantiated <x> being thought of existing in reality. millican thinks that 
the comparison of greatness between uninstantiated <x> and instantiated 
<x> does not make sense because if <x> is not instantiated in reality, there 
is no such thing as <x> that is instantiated in reality. That is why he rejects 
premises (3’) and (4’) of the alternative formulation, where the argument 
makes the comparison of greatness between a-nature-than-which-no-
greater-nature-can-be-thought that is instantiated in reality and the same 
nature that is not instantiated in reality. Yet this means that millican 
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commits himself, unconsciously, to a version of the comparison difficulty, 
which says, as we saw in section 2, that ‘[t]here seems to be something 
logically odd about purporting to compare something that exists only “in 
the mind” with something existing in reality’ (millican 2004, p. 443). Thus, 
millican’s objection to the alternative formulation is not as metaphysically 
neutral as he thinks it is. The comparison difficulty, to which millican does 
not allow opponents of the ontological argument to commit themselves, 
is hidden in his own theory of natures. (The version of the comparison 
difficulty that millican endorses might be slightly weaker than the 
standard version introduced in section 2 of this paper, because while 
the standard version does not seem to allow the comparison of greatness 
between any instantiated nature, on the one hand, and any uninstantiated 
nature, on the other, his version allows the comparison of greatness 
between instantiated <x> and uninstantiated <y> provided that x is not 
identical to y. For example, millican allows the comparison of greatness 
between instantiated <Aurelius> and uninstantiated <God>.6 As I explain 
below, however, whether or not millican’s comparison difficulty is weaker 
than the standard version is beside the point.)
There is yet another problem for millican, which is that his response 
to the alternative formulation contradicts his own claim that he does not 
rely on a specific reading of Anselm’s text. As I mentioned earlier, the 
standard reading of the relevant passage in the Proslogion suggests that 
Anselm compares two beings: God existing only in the mind and God 
existing both in the mind and in reality, rather than God existing only 
in the mind and something else existing both in the mind and in reality. 
If, as millican says himself, he is ‘undogmatic about the interpretative 
issue’ (millican 2007, p. 1041), he has to be open to the standard reading. 
6 millican’s objection to the original formulation of the ontological argument is based 
on the assumption that Anselm endorses Pse, which, again, says that a nature that is 
instantiated in reality is greater than one that is not. millican thinks that we can safely 
make this assumption because Anselm does not correct Gaunilo’s attribution of the 
following thesis to him: ‘if this same being [God] exists in the mind alone, anything 
that existed also in reality would be greater than this being’ (Gaunilo 1078, p. 157). In 
my 2007 paper I agree with millican that the thesis that Gaunilo attributes to Anselm is 
indeed equivalent to Pse. However, if, as millican seems to think, Pse implicitly assumes 
that the comparison of greatness is impossible between a nature that is not instantiated 
in reality and the same nature that is instantiated in reality, then the thesis in question 
is not equivalent to Pse. The above quote from Gaunilo does not say anything about the 
impossibility of the comparison of greatness between a nature that is not instantiated in 
reality and the same nature that is instantiated.
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Yet the way in which he responds to the alternative formulation of the 
ontological argument excludes such a  reading; his response does not 
allow us to make the comparison of greatness between God existing 
only in the mind and God existing both in the mind and in reality (or 
<God> that is not instantiated in reality and <God> that is instantiated 
in reality), despite the fact that it allows the comparison of greatness 
between God existing only in the mind and God existing in the mind 
and also being thought of existing in reality.
In sum: millican’s objection to the alternative formulation precludes 
us from comparing God existing only in the mind and God existing 
both in the mind and in reality. This entails that his objection fails 
because it contradicts its own two unique features discussed in section 
2. With respect to the first feature, i.e., purporting not to make any 
deep metaphysical assumption, it does make such a deep metaphysical 
assumption as a  version of the comparison difficulty. Admittedly the 
version that millican holds could be weaker than the original version; 
one might judge that millican’s is not even a version of the comparison 
difficulty. That is, however, beside the point. The point is that, contrary 
to what he believes, millican commits himself to a deep metaphysical 
assumption, to which, again, he does not allow opponents of the 
ontological argument to commit themselves. With respect to the second 
unique feature, i.e., purporting not to rely on a specific reading of the 
relevant Anselmian text, millican’s response to the alternative formulation 
of the ontological argument does rely on a specific, non-standard reading 
of Anselm’s text. Conversely, if millican does not adopt the non-standard 
reading, he cannot defend his objection in the first place.
VII. CoNClusIoN
Whether or not the ontological argument ultimately succeeds it seems 
unlikely that critics can construct a  convincing objection which 
questions only shallow logical details of the argument. Any objection 
to the argument seems to make, implicitly or explicitly, a  significant 
metaphysical assumption and could also rely on a specific reading of the 
relevant Anselmian text. since both the metaphysical assumptions and 
the specific readings of Anselm’s text are all contentious in their own 
right, there is no refutation of the argument that satisfies the majority of 
analysts of the argument. The beauty of the ontological argument seems 
to remain intact even more than 930 years after Anselm introduced it.
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